Truth is One by Engel, Pascal
 Philosophia Scientiæ
Travaux d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences 
13-1 | 2009
Varia
Truth is One
Pascal Engel
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/68
DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.68
ISSN: 1775-4283
Publisher
Éditions Kimé
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 April 2009
Number of pages: 1-12
ISBN: 978-2-84174-490-9
ISSN: 1281-2463
 
Electronic reference
Pascal Engel, « Truth is One », Philosophia Scientiæ [Online], 13-1 | 2009, Online since 01 April 2012,
connection on 04 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/68  ; DOI :
10.4000/philosophiascientiae.68 
Tous droits réservés
Truth is One
Pascal Engel
Université de Genève
Résumé : Cet article examine la conception « pluraliste » de la vérité défen-
due par Crispin Wright, et souligne ses difficultés et son flirt dangereux avec le
relativisme. On suggère qu’une solution à ces difficultés, suggérée par Wright
lui-même, pourrait consister dans le « fonctionnalisme » au sujet de la vérité,
selon lequel la vérité serait une propriété formelle « réalisée » de manière mul-
tiple dans différents domaines. Mais cette thèse en fait n’échappe pas non plus
aux difficultés du pluralisme. On soutient qu’il faut admettre que la vérité est
une, et non pas plurielle, et une forme de réalisme au sujet de la vérité, fondée
sur une base épistémologique.
Abstract: This paper examines the “pluralist” conception of truth defended
by Crispin Wright, and stresses its difficulties and its dangerous flirtation with
relativsm. A solution to these difficulties, which Wright himself contemplates,
consists in embracing a functionalist theory of truth, according to which truth
is a kind of formal property “realised” differently in various domains. But this
view, it is argued, does not get rid of the difficulties of pluralism. It is then
argued that we have to accept that truth is one, not many, and a kind of
realism about truth, on an epistemological basis.
1. The problem of the unity of truth
Is truth one or many? In other words, is there a single and unique prop-
erty of being true which applies to all truths whatsoever, or are there
different kinds of truth? Our intuitions go both ways. On the one hand
if truth is truth it should not be truth-P for P -things or P - discourse,
truth-R for R-things, etc. On the other hand we want to account for
the fact that there are different kinds of things and properties to which
truth applies. As Blackburn [Blackburn 1984, 230] remarks, we know
individually what makes ‘[it is true]’ applicable to judgments or sen-
tences of an understood language. For instance “Penguins waddle” is
true if and only if penguins waddle, “snow is white” is true if and only
if snow is white. The reason the first sentence deserves the predicate is
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that penguins waddle. The reason the judgment that snow is white de-
serves the predicate is that snow is white. But these reasons are entirely
different. There is no single account in virtue of which each deserves
the predicate, for deciding whether penguins waddle has nothing much
in common with deciding whether snow is white. There are as many
different things to do to decide that the predicate applies, as there are
judgments to make. So how can there be a unified “common” account of
the property which these different decision procedures supposedly deter-
mine? What is common to truths? What is common to moral, physical,
mathematical, normative truths? And about aesthetic matters, about
the comic? etc.
In general there are four types of solutions to this problem. a) A first
solution is to deny that all discourses are truth apt (e.g. expressivism
about moral discourse, or fictionalism about mathematical truths). Let
us call this truth chauvinism. b) Another solution is to accept that they
are all true alike. Let us call this truth monism. c) A third solution is
to say that not all truths are true alike. This is called alethic pluralism.
d) There is a fourth solution, which is associated with a particular view
of truth. According to the deflationist conception of truth, all truth are
alike—and in this sense this conception resembles truth monism, but
they are not alike in a substantial way. Truth is not a “heavy weight
property”: it is not a property such as being square, or being made
of wood, or even like being red. It is a “thin” or “light” property. In
another sense, however, the deflationist accepts the disunity of truth.
The deflationist bites the bullet. Truth is not a common property that
our sentences or judgments have. It is only a syntactical device by which
we can form an infinite disjunction of sentences of the form
“P ” is true iff P
or
it is true that P iff P .
So if you talk of penguins you will say that it’s true that they waddle
iff they waddle, if you talk of cabbages it’s true that they are tasty iff
they are tasty, if you talk of kings it’s true that they are polite iff they
are polite, etc. [Blackburn & Simons 2000]. So a form of pluralism is
the immediate consequence of deflationism: there are as many truths as
there are kinds of discourses and kinds of things to talk about. Truth
is equally applicable to each discourse: truth is fiction, in mathematics,
in ethics, etc. No problem with that, for truth is purely an expressive
device, lightweight and with no ontological consequence. Another conse-
quence of deflationism is quietism: realism disputes vanish. In so far as
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realism is signaled by the applicability of the predicate “true” to a given
domain, realism is applicable everywhere. But this is just to say that
it is applicable nowhere, for if everything is truth-valuable, hence real,
then nothing is.
2. Wright’s minimalism
Wright’s minimalism [Wright 1993] seems to illustrate these commit-
ments of deflationism. Although Wright claims that he is not a defla-
tionist about truth, the problem of the unity and plurality of truth is
particularly salient for him. First Wright defends syntacticalism about
truth, the thesis that “true” is a predicate, although a “lightweight” one,
which satisfies only formal or syntactic features: it obeys the equivalence
or the disquotational schema, is such that statements which are apt for
truth have negations which are likewise, that they can be embedded in
conditional and propositional attitudes constructions. The minimalist
in Wright’s sense also claims that truth satisfies a set of platitudes :
- To assert a statement is to present it as true (transparency)
- Truth is correspondence to the facts (correspondence)
- A statement may be justified without being true and vice versa
(contrast)
- Truth is absolute and has no degrees (absoluteness)
- Truth is timeless (timelessness)
- Truth is objective, and implies convergence (convergence).
These are platitudes because they are the usual marks (in David Wig-
gins’ sense [Wiggins 1980]) of our ordinary concept of truth, but they
do not imply a substantial definition of the concept. To this extent,
Wright’s view resembles the deflationist’s. The deflationist, however, in
holding that truth is nothing but the capacity to assert a given state-
ment, holds that truth does not register a norm distinct from warranted
assertibility. But Wright disagrees. Truth registers a distinct norm.1
Actually, in many cases, the norm which truth registers is the norm of
superassertibility, where a statement is superassertible if some actually
accessible state of information—a state of information which this world
1This is his “inflationary” argument, [Wright 1993, ch. 2].
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would generate in a suitable receptive investigative subject—justifies its
assertion and which will continue to do so no matter enlarged upon or
improved.
An important consequence of Wright’s minimalism is that the issue of
the nature of truth and the issue of realism are not systematically linked.
A T -predicate, satisfying the syntactic and formal constraints, applies to
a number of discourses: ethical, mathematical, etc. It will not be uniform
across all discourses. There is no reason to expect that truth about the
physical world will be the same as truth about mathematical entities, and
that both will be the same as truth about moral matters. On Wright’s
view, it may well be that truth could be a form of correspondence with
independent states of affairs about the physical world, whereas it is closer
to superassertibility in mathematical or moral matters. It may also be
different in the domain of the comic. Some discourses may be more
apt for truth than others, even though truth applies to a variety of
discourses. But how are we to frame the realist-anti-realist disputes?
Wright proposes the familiar Euthyphro contrast: that an act is pious
if and only if it is loved by the gods, can be understood a) in the anti-
realist or response dependent sense: pious acts are such because they
are loved by the gods, or b) in the realist sense: it is because some
acts are pious that the gods love them. Generalising, there are certain
discourses which are true because P ′s best opinion has it that P , whereas
others are such that best opinion has it that P because P . How do we
know that we are in one case or the other? There are some a priori
requirements for a discourse to be truth-apt or not. One is cognitive
command, the other is width of cosmological role. Cognitive command
is the feature instantiated when observers disagree on a feature of X , this
can be traced to some shortcoming of their cognitive apparatus, because
the feature is reliably tracked, in the usual cases, by this apparatus.
Width of cosmological role is the feature instantiated when a subject
matter can best be explained by independent states of affairs.
Now, given that these a priori requirements are not uniform, plural-
ism about truth follows:
One who takes a minimalist line about truth, that the con-
cept is fixed by a number of platitudes about it, ought to be
open to the possibility. . . that it may have a variety of mod-
els. . . This potential plurality reflects the distinctions that are
relevant to the realism/antirealism debate: that the justifi-
cation of a broadly realist or antirealist view turns on the
character of the local realist-antirealist debate. [Wright, C.
1996, PPR 4, 923].
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Officially, Wright’s minimalism is neither a realism nor an anti-realism
about truth, since truth is not uniform across discourses. But Wright’s
actual view may be called a minimal anti-realism, because “the general
rule is that realism has to be earned” and that “anti-realism is the default
position” [Wright 1992, 149]. One starts from an anti-realist predicate,
where truth is response dependent, and one sees from there whether the
domain is more or less shaped by a stronger notion of truth, such as
superassertibility and correspondence. In most cases, superassertibility
is the proper model of truth (in particular ethics), in other domains (in
particular the comic) it is not.
Wright’s view, however, raises the problem of unity again. As David
Wiggins [Wiggins 2002] puts it, any predicate, say φ, is a truth predicate
if, for every sentence S of language, or any proposition expressible in a
given language, we have : φ (S) iff S (where “(S)” is the name of a sen-
tence of the language and the rightmost “S” is the sentence itself). The
question then is: how can we fix the meaning of φ without presupposing
that it denotes truth itself?
The main difficulty for truth pluralism has been raised by Williamson
[Williamson 1994], see also [Tappolet 1997]. It is the problem of mixed
inferences. If one infers (3) from (1) and (2):
(1) Waddling penguins are amusing.
(2) That penguin waddles.
(3) Therefore that penguin is amusing.
The inference cannot go through, since (1) is a comic truth, whereas
(2) is a truth about penguins. Because the word “true” does not have
the same meaning is (2) and in (1) and (3) respectively, the inference is
not valid. The same problem affects generalizations about truth, such
as:
(4) “Everything you said is true”.
But if you said things about ethics, mathematics, law, the comic
and the physical world, then we can’t generalize with (4). What then
can the criterion of truth-aptitude be? We encounter a dilemma. On
the one hand, if the criterion of truth-aptness is but the capacity of a
predicate for each domain to behave “syntactically” or formally as a truth
predicate, then in this sense all discourses all equal, and truth-aptness is
a well-shared property. If, on the other hand, truth aptitude is a further
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issue which can only be settled locally, how can it make for different
“kinds of truths” in each respective domain? For if the different kinds are
kinds of truths, how can truth be thought of as uniform in the first place?
The answer given byWright to the problem of mixed inferences shows the
proximity of minimalism to deflationism [Wright 1994]: in the penguin
inference (1)-(3), the premises need only satisfy the platitudes. So the
predicate “true” is not ambiguous, and it is lightweight. The problem
with this answer, as Gerald Vision [Vision 2004, 102] has remarked, is
that either the platitudes yield the concept of truth we are after, or they
don’t. If they do, this amounts to deflationism. If they don’t this does
not solve the mixed inference difficulty.
3. Truth functionalism
A solution, functionalism about truth, has been proposed by Pettit [Pet-
tit 1996] and Lynch [Lynch 2001]. It seems to have been partially en-
dorsed by Wright himself [Wright 1996]. Just as, according to function-
alism about mental states, our use of “belief”, “desire” and other mental
terms, can be individuated in terms of the role that they play, together
with other states, in mediating between inputs and outputs, we could
say that the predicate “true” is a place mark for a certain role marked
by the usual platitudes: asserting statements that one believes, which
correspond to reality, on which people can converge, etc. But the issue
of the nature of the properties which “realize” these roles is left open.
Truth is a property which can be variably realized, just as a functional
property can be so. Summarizing the idea, Wright says:
The concept of truth admits a uniform characterisation wher-
ever it is applied—the characterisation given by the minimal
platitudes, which determine what is essential to truth. . . The
form of pluralism for which space is allowed by this overarch-
ing uniformity is variable realization. What constitutes the
existence of a number is different from what constitutes the
existence of a material object. [Wright 1996]
In other words truth is a second-order property of our statements,
which has to be realized in various ways in first order properties which
will underlie this role. In each case we shall give arguments to secure
that the realist story is correct or not. The idea is close to one which
had been advanced by David Wiggins in his theory of identity [Wiggins
1980]. Identity is the one and only relation captured by the principles
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of reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, substitutivity and the identity of
indiscernibles, but there are varying conditions of identity for material
objects, persons, events, etc. Similarly truth is a multiply realizable
role-property, which we can “ramsify” with a Ramsey sentence:
x has a property that plays the truth-role if and only if
∃t1[A(t1 . . . O1 . . . On) & x has t1],
where “A” is the conjunction of our intuitive beliefs about truth.
This is an appealing view. But truth functionalism is, like Wright’s
minimalism, unstable [Wright 2005], [Lynch 2006]. First, on truth func-
tionalism, is truth a role property or is it a realizer property: is truth
the higher order property in which various realizer properties are realized
(truth about ethics, comedy, maths, etc.) or is it the realizer property
itself? If truth is the realizer property, it is not a general property at
all. Second, is truth a higher order property or a concept? If truth is
a higher order property of properties multiply realized how can it be
the common property of all these different properties? The alternative
would be to say that the concept of truth (captured by the platitudes)
is common, but that the properties are differently realized. The prob-
lem then is that the analogy with functionalism breaks down. Either
way alethic functionalism ressembles deflationism, and we are back to
the difficult already encountered with Wright’s minimalism. If there is
no common property of truth which various domains realize, but only a
concept associated with various platitudes, then the view comes close to
deflationism.
4. Minimal realism
Some writers have proposed a view related to truth functionalism. Alston
[Alston 1996] defends what he calls alethic realism, and Lynch [Lynch
2001] what he calls alethic pluralism. I have myself defended a related
view which I called minimal realism [Engel 2002]. Minimal realism in-
corporates four minimalist commitments:
(1) it agrees with minimalism on the fact that truth is a "thin" notion
satisfying the discipline of syntax and the associated platitudes
about assertion, correspondence, convergence, etc;
(2) it rejects, however, the thesis that truth is a mere logical device of
assertion or of disquotation; truth registers a distinctive norm;
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(3) it takes truth-bearers to be propositions, or the contents of beliefs,
and assumes that we need to have an independent account of these
contents;
(4) it is not, however, pluralistic, since it does not take the truth pred-
icate to be ambiguous with respect to different domains; truth has
a uniform core-meaning defined by its role but which is realized in
different ways from domain to domain.
Minimal realism is also a form of realism because it says that:
(5) the uniformity of the truth-predicate does not neutralize the is-
sues about realism and anti-realism which arise from domain to
domain; a minimalism about truth does not imply a minimalism
about truth-aptness ;
(6) in each domain, truth-aptness is to be judged after the realist cri-
terion of the independence of a domain from our responses, and of
verification transcendence: our best conceptions might be false;
(7) in each domain, realistic truth, in the sense of (6) is the norm of
our inquiries.
Minimal realism, however, has the same problem as truth function-
alism, since (4) leads to the same problem as truth functionalism.
5. The norm of truth and extended realism
None of the versions of functionalism about truth is satisfactory. The
problem does not come simply from the ambiguous status of truth as
both a higher-order and a realizer property, but it comes also from the
conception of the norm of truth that is presupposed by truth function-
alism. On Wright’s picture, the content of this norm is a special form of
warranted assertibility: superassertibility. A discourse obeys the norm
of truth if it carries with it the requirements of syntactic discipline and
if it aims at superassertability as a model for truth. But, as we saw
above, the discourse does not need, on his view, to carry over to realist
truth, although it can, if realism happens to be justified within a spe-
cific domain. Anti-realism is the default option. But what if instead
we took realism as the default option? What if, instead of truth, we
took the norm of assertion to be knowledge? The result would be, in my
view, a much more unified conception of the truth property. But that
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would also lead us to a rejection of pluralism about truth. For Wright
superassertibility is at least a necessary condition for knowledge:
(KS) If p is knowable, then p is superassertible.
Note that the converse is not true: superassertibility is not a suffi-
cient condition for knowledge [Wright 1993, 58]. What KS involves is
that assertion implies warranted assertibility in a strong enough sense to
imply its objectivity, although in a weak enough sense to imply that it is
not knowledge (superassertibility). Let us agree with Wright that truth
is the norm of belief, which is stronger than warranted assertibility. If
so, its being a norm of assertion in a general, substantial, property of
truth itself. But where the minimalist, the pluralist and the functionalist
about truth go wrong is that they do not acknowledge that standards
of assertion carry more weight than truth pluralism allows. Although I
shall not defend this view here, and take it for granted, there are good
reasons to hold [Williamson 2000], [Engel 2002, 129] the knowledge ac-
count of assertion according to which assertion is governed by the norm
of knowledge:
KAA Assert p only if you know that p.
On this view, an assertion is warranted only if the speaker knows
that P . Therefore the criterion of truth aptitude is the capacity to know
a proposition in the respective domains. Let us apply this to the issue
of pluralism. We shall say that:
If a discourse permits warranted assertions then it permits
the expression of knowledge
This applies to mathematical truth, to moral truth, to aesthetic
truth, etc. This extends to the comic: if I do not know that Chaplin is
funny then I cannot assert that Chaplin is funny.
But does KAA entail realism? No. To say that a discourse permits
the expression of knowledge is not immediately to vindicate realism. A
minimal anti-realist notion of truth can be associated to a minimal anti-
realist notion of knowledge. But knowledge entails realism. To know
about a subject matter is to know about a domain to which realist truth
applies. If this is so, we can reformulate Wright’s notion of cognitive
command, in a stronger way. The general criterion of knowledge is safety,
in the sense that if one knows that P , one is reliable about P and one
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cannot easily be wrong about P [Sosa 1999], [Williamson 2000], [Engel
2007].
The condition of warrant to assert P applies to a range of cases only
if the truth condition of P applies to a wider range of cases. (This is an
application of Williamson’s Margins or error principle). Such a condition
of knowledge on assertion is stronger than cognitive command.
It means that truth always outruns superassertibility. Some dis-
courses may suffer massive reference failure. But if a discourse has
genuine standards for warranted assertion, it is subject to the norm
of truth by way of the norm of knowledge and realism is the default
option [Williamson 1996]. This implies a rejection of pluralism, since
there will be domains where we cannot assert anything, just because we
do not know about the domain. There is no reason, therefore to expect
anti-realism by default.2 If this is so, truth is one, not many.3
Références
Alston, W.
1996 A realist Theory of truth, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Blackburn, S.
1985 Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Blackburn, S. & Simons, K. (Eds.)
2000 Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Engel, P.
2002 Truth, Acumen: Chesham.
2007 Va savoir, Paris : Hermann.
Lynch, M.
2001 Truth in context, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.
2006 Rewrighting pluralism, The Monist, 89 (1), 63–84.
2Of course there is no obstacle, on this view, to argue for realism in a certain
domain, e.g. ethics, or aesthetics, as Pouivet [Pouivet 2005] has recently done. I
interpret his thesis as the thesis that there can be aesthetic knowledge, in the strong
sense of the term.
3I have read versions of this paper at the (Anti)Realisms conference in Nancy in
2006, at the University of Kyoto in March 2008, and at the University of Lima in
June 2008. I thank for their remarks on these occasions Peter Van Inwagen, Michael
Lynch, Roger Pouivet, Graham Priest, Pablo Quintanilla and Alberto Cordero Lecca.
Truth is One 11
Pettit, P.
1996 Realism and Truth: A Comment on Crispin Wright’s Truth
and Objectivity, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56,
883–890.
Pouivet, R.
2005 Le réalisme esthétique, Paris : PUF.
Sosa, E.
1999 How to Defeat Opposition to Moore, in Tomberlin, J. E. (Ed.)
Epistemology, Philosophical Perspectives 13, 141–153.
Tappolet, C.
1997 Mixed Inferences: A Problem for Pluralism about Truth Pred-
icates, Analysis, 57 (3), 209–210.
Vision, G.
2004 Veritas: the Correspondence Theory and its Critics, Cambridge
(Mass.): MIT Press.
Wiggins, D.
1980 Sameness and substance, Oxford: Blackwell, (2nd ed. aug-
mented Sameness and substance Renewed, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
1980a What would be a substantial theory of truth?, in Van Staaten,
Z. (Ed.) Philosophical Subjects, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2000 Marks of Truth, in What is truth, R. Shank (Ed.), Berlin: de
Gruyter.
Williamson, T.
1994 Review of Wright 1993, International Journal of Philosophical
Studies, 2, 10–44.
1996 Unreflective Realism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search, 56 (4), 905–909.
2000 Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, Cory
2005 Remarks on the functionalization of pluralist approaches to
truth, Synthese, 145, 1–28.
Wright, C.
1993 Truth and Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12
1994 Realism, Pure and Simple?: Reply to Timothy Williamson’s
Critical Study of Truth and Objectivity, in International Journal
of Philosophical Studies, 2, 147–161.
1996 Replies, Philosophy and phenomenological Research, LVI, 4,
863–868 (précis) and 911–941 (responses).
